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          Employing around a few thousand part time reporters, county stations focus on local events that are of major concern to their listeners. The leading topics are related to agricultural production, including such matters as weather conditions and advice on crops and techniques. Also featured are local amateur and professional performers and songs from regional operas. (29) The relative autonomy of local stations was deliberate on the part of the Party. A 1956 memo explained that,

 

        ...while it is necessary to relay certain programs of the Central People's Broadcasting Station at specific hours, a more important task should be to strive to improve locally originated programs. Furthermore, local programs were to be designed to publicize and promote agricultural producers' cooperatives, to constantly stimulate the enthusiasm for labor among the peasants, to agitate for high agricultural production, and to satisfy the peasants' demand for cultural life. (30)

                    CPBS, located in Beijing and tightly controlled by the Party, dominates radio programming in China. Until recently it reached larger audiences than print or television, and it remains among the primary tools of the government for transmitting information, policies, and ideology. The structure of CPBS includes an office of directors, a personnel department, a propaganda office, and individual news and features departments. It is directly administered by the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television, and under the supervision of the Propaganda Department of the Party Central Committee. (31) It broadcasts a total of six channels, of which two are national in scope. Of the remainder, two broadcast to overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and one is designed for the national minorities and uses minority languages. The final station offers musical programming for Beijing and surrounding areas. (32) Also under direct control of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television is Radio Beijing, which broadcasts domestic and international news in 38 languages to audiences all over the world. (33)

          The two national stations, which use standard Mandarin, broadcast a total of over 40 hours a day. Their programming is comprised of news, features, entertainment and cultural shows. News originates from the central Xinhua News Agency, and the shows are a mixture of "soft" news, updates, background information, and international news. The important news shows include a morning broadcast, "News and Newspaper Clippings" taken from national and local papers, and an afternoon "News and Summaries" show. Features tend to be broad, informative, and educational. Shows examine such topics as science and technology, hygiene, and history. A number of shows are broadcast for children. Cultural shows comprise 55 percent of CPBS programming. These predominantly focus on music, although opera and drama are also popular. Other forms of cultural programs include discussions about the development of art and culture throughout China. (34)

          The importance that Communist Party ascribes to radio is apparent in the close supervision that it continues to exercise, or tries to exercise, over the content of radio. A directive issued by the Ministry of Radio and Television at the end of 1984 explained the role of radio and other media.

  Radio and television are pieces of the Party and the government. The must serve to define the Party's general task and objectives for the new historical era... They should be careful in handling the news of the economic reforms in 1985, especially news about reforms of the price and wage systems. The should consult the State Council and receive permission before releasing any news about the specific reform measures of the government.(35)

          Other directives addressed less political matters, such as the following from February of 1985.

    Some media organizations recently reported on activities such as "beauty contests." At present these kinds of activities should not be reported too much. (36)

          The scope of radio broadcast in China grew rapidly after 1949. Much of the growth resulted from Party policies aimed at facilitating its expansion. Beginning with a directive in April of 1950, every government agency, army unit, organization, factory and school were required to appoint broadcasting monitors. The monitors were charged with the task of tracking the important radio broadcasts, announcing the schedule to the members of the unit, and gather the members to collectively listen to important broadcasts over the unit loudspeakers. (37)

          Wired broadcasting networks employing public speakers provided the primary form of radio access during prior to the 1980's, and they continue to be used extensively in China today. A powerful, off-the air receiver picks up the broadcasts, amplifies them, and then sends them through a speaker to distribution points. Although private radio sets were rare, wired public loudspeakers proliferated during the 1950's. There were 20,519 monitoring stations in 1952, and just three years later the number had increased to 51,200. During the period of agricultural collectivization, the number of loudspeakers skyrocketed to 4,570,000. (38) Although the growth of radio was slowed during the periods of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the reach of radio continued to expand, and by the end of the Cultural Revolution at least 95 percent of the population had access to wired broadcasts.

          Radio was the first truly mass medium in China, and it is difficult to overestimate the role it played in perpetuating ideas of nationhood and consolidating Communist power. In no other country or era had a single medium reached as many people as Chinese radio in the first three decades of the People's Republic. Despite entertainment shows that gained a certain degree of popularity, radio cannot be considered a form of popular culture. Its appeal resulted from the combined factors of political compulsion and a lack of alternative forms of entertainment. It also was neither a commercial or consumer-based medium. When popular music began to emerge in China, state control of broadcasting ensured that, with a few exceptions such as Radio Shanghai, the new musical forms were prohibited from the airways, and the music had to rely on other means of transmittal. Nevertheless, the political and social significance of radio foreshadowed the role that television came to play in the 1980's and 1990's.

          From the early days in Yenan, Mao Zedong recognized the significance of local drama troupes as well as their potential as a form of propaganda. The early years of the People's Republic witnessed the reform and retooling of traditional operas. Some were banned, others remained in the repertoires of state-controlled drama troupes. On 4 May 1951, the Government Administrative Council established its position on musical drama, but the official doctrine remained difficult to interpret.

Operas which promote propaganda for anti-aggression, anti-oppression, love-motherland, love-freedom, love-labor, righteousness and good nature of the people should be encouraged and promoted. On the other hand, those that advocate feudalistic morality, cruelty, horror, obscenity and which ridicule or insult the laborers should be banned. (39)
      Throughout the 1950s, debate ranged over which aspects of traditional opera should be preserved, and which should be banned as "feudal". Most old plays were still performed but were edited to remove material deemed "counter-revolutionary." One controversy, for example, was whether to allow the appearance on stage of ghosts, which were featured in majority of traditional Chinese plays. A temporary compromise was reached, and it was decided that "ghosts with rebellious and folk qualities should be permitted to appear on stage." (39) Performers continued to operate in much the same manner as they had done traditionally, traveling and performing for a range of audiences, such as factories, army units, and villages.

          In the late 1950s, the party began experimenting its own versions of musical drama, or Revolutionary Opera. It began with the White Haired Girl , an early propaganda film that in 1958 was transformed into an opera with traditional operatic music and singing. The plot dealt with a young woman oppressed by a landlord until rescued by the Communists. In the White Haired Girl, the elaborate traditional opera apparel and make-up was replaced with modern costumes such as Red Army uniforms and ragged peasant clothing. The ascendancy of Revolutionary Operas signaled the beginning of a Party crackdown against the traditional operas. For example, all scenes featuring ghosts were banned in 1963. The restrictions on opera in the early 1960s were indicative of Party actions and attitudes towards all forms of culture, particularly on the grounds of content. In August 1961, the Ten Points on Literature and Art were issued, calling for the creation of improved new works of art that serve the people aesthetically and ideologically. This attitude was reflected in an article by playwright Chao Hsun.

A play is shown for the audience. What is harmful and what is beneficial must be judged according to the effect on the masses... The laboring people of today, compared with those before the liberation, have generally elevated their ideological awareness and cultural level. However, the remnants of old are still a burden on the people's spirit, and superstition is one of them... To be entirely free of such mental confinement, long term education and struggle are required. Under this condition, what will be the effect of showing "ghost plays" on stage? Apparently, it will only promote the negative effect of superstition... and superstition will hamper the people from accepting the socialist and Communist ideologies, cause them to yield to destiny, and disbelieve that the laboring people can use their own two hands to reform society and the world... It will also furnish the counter-revolutionary elements with openings. (41)

          Revolutionary Opera fully came into its own only with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and the ascendancy of Jiang Qing in the mid-1960s. In 1966, as part of the broader call to destroy all vestiges of the past, all traditional operas were banned, and only five Revolutionary Operas approved by Jiang Qing were allowed to be performed. (42) Three more were written and approved later. (43)

          As a genre, Revolutionary Opera is clearly the bastard child of traditional opera, and can be classified as much by its similarities to as its differences from the traditional style. The singing style remained unchanged, except for a quickened tempo to convey vigor and force, and the traditional music and instruments likewise persisted, although a few Western instruments were sometimes included. On the other hand, the standard characters were replaced with members of the proletariat and the occasional landlord; established theatrical role types were replaced merely with standard heroes and villains. The symbolism of traditional opera was abandoned in favor of realistic scenery and artifacts, and ordinary clothing or military uniforms, rather than elaborate costumes, were worn by performers. Lastly, the values shifted from humanity, family love, and brotherhood to comradeship, industry, and revolution. (44)

          The popular appeal and cultural impact of Revolutionary Operas is difficult to analyze. The Chinese opera-going public clearly preferred traditional forms to the Party's innovations, which may in part explain why classical opera was banned in 1966. (45) Revolutionary Opera existed in a cultural vacuum, and thus the level of public interest in it may have very likely stemmed solely from the fact that there was no other form of entertainment available at the time. Rebroadcasts dominated television programming, and Revolutionary Opera music provided the was virtually the only music played on the radio. Nor can it be evaluated in the context of later social climates: the model Revolutionary Operas were banned at the end of the Cultural Revolution, and even following their resurgence, their historical connotations were sufficiently negative to deter most members of the prospective audience. Much of the popularity of the new operas were also based on their symbolism at the time, as young Red Guards trying to configure themselves as revolutionary were eager to consume and support cultural material declared by the Party to be ideological beneficial. Moreover, the main motivation for older audience members was likely its approximation to the traditional musical drama that they had enjoyed, and, given a choice, most would have preferred the older forms. Therefore, Revolutionary Opera was not so much a popular but a popularized culture, which had been created and vertically delivered as a tool of the dominant entity.

          In Revolutionary Opera, as well as in the "revolutionary" folk songs and other forms of "revolutionary" culture created by the Communists, the Party attmepted to apply the "mass line." The concept of the "mass line" entails that the needs and concerns of the masses are constantly expressed to the Party so that it can reformulate them and instruct the masses how to meet their needs through conforming to Party orders. The development of a "mass line" is based upon the existence of system of mass communication. The "mass line" itself resembles the nature of popular culture, with the tastes of the public shaping the basic formation of culture on a local level, from which it trickles up to the political and economic elites, who supervise the repackaging, standardization, and redistribution of popularly-originating culture. However, the popular culture of the Maoist era, like the CCP "mass line", was much more an elite product enforced upon the masses than a popular product infiltrating the centers of power. As such it cannot be truly considered popular culture.

Endnotes for Chapter 2, Part 2
29. Bishop, p. 117.
30. Cited in Chang (1989), p. 160.
31. Ibid., p. 165.
32. Ibid., p. 155.
33. Ibid., p. 189.
34. Howkins, p. 57-58.
35. Cited in Chang (1989), p. 169.
36. Broadcasting Editors' Daily, 19 February 1985, as cited in Chang (1989), p. 169.
37. Chang (1989), p. 157.
38. Ibid., p. 158-159.
39. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 7 May 1951, as cited in Liu, p. 21.
40. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 3 October 1956, as cited in Liu, p. 26.
41. Wen-Yi Bao (Literary Gazette), as cited in Liu, Alan P.L, p. 30.
42. These five were: Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, The Red Lantern, Shachiapang, The Raid on White Tiger Regiment, and On the Docks. A thematic summary of all five can be found in Cheng, Philip, "A Comparative Value Analysis: Traditional versus Revolutionary Opera," in Chu (1978), p. 108-110.
43. These were:Dragan River, Azalea Mountain, and War in the Plain, summaries of which can be found in Chu and Cheng, p. 100-101.
44. Chu and Cheng, p. 84-85.
45. Hamm, p. 14.

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© L. Movius, April 1998
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