In 1978, China instituted the first steps of what was to become sweeping economic reform. In addition to its direct economic and political implications, reform had tremendous social and cultural ramifications. The changes in the structure of and attitudes towards work have radically altered personal values and priorities in all areas of life. The disposable income of both families and individuals in rural and urban areas alike have displaced traditional modes of consumption with an all-encompassing capitalist consumerism reminiscent of systems in more developed countries. The rise of consumerism in China has provided both the displacement of values and the dispersal of technology necessary for the emergence of a popular culture based on the mass media.

        The reforms launched in 1978 marked the end of, and largely grew out of, the destruction of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Economic stability, it was hoped, would ensure political stability, and prevent the reoccurrence of past events. Almost three decades of ill-advised and poorly implemented economic policies had left the national economy in shambles. Deng Xiaoping rose to power on his appeal as a pragmatist, and economic growth provided the foundation of his legitimacy. The failure to deliver the promised levels of economic development significantly undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the Communist Party, and the ascendant leadership recognized that continued economic stagnation could signal the end of their regime. The leadership, however, had little idea of what sort of unintended consequences their "socialist capitalism with Chinese characteristics" would bring. Reform touched upon virtually all aspects of Chinese economic life: domestic and international, urban and rural, public and private. After decades looking inwards and viewing the rest of the world with suspicion China began to open up to the rest of the world. China's internationalization began politically with the normalization of relations with the United States in 1971 and continued economically with the establishment of international trade links in the "open door" policy. In order to develop its own industry, China needed the technology and expertise that could only be obtained through importation. The use of equipment, machinery and even entire plants imported from abroad posed an ideological dilemma to the Party, which it unsuccessfully sought to circumvent through using domestic labor to operate them. (47)

        With the yuan weak on the international currency market, China was required to pursue sources of foreign exchange in order to afford necessary imports. Foreign investment and tourism provided two of the best sources of foreign exchange. Foreign and overseas Chinese tourists flocked into the country, often bringing with them cultural products unavailable on the mainland. Much of the foreign trade, investment and tourism centered around the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), where special concessions such as tariff relief were granted to facilitate and encourage export industries. After 1987, the Coastal Development Strategy expanded the SEZs throughout almost the entire southern coast. As Chinese exports grew at a phenomenal rate, its imports began to diversify beyond technology and industrial equipment. Through both legal and illegal channels, China began to import foreign cultural products. (48)

        Chinese industries, long reliant on official subsidies, were suddenly ordered to operate efficiently and profitably. The system of price controls and subsidies were eliminated, companies were given authority over hiring and firing of workers, and a bankruptcy law was passed and implemented. State-owned enterprises were forced to respond to market forces such as supply and demand, and moreover had to compete with each other in order to maintain their shares of the market. Economic competition resulted in expanded consumer choice in everything from flavors of instant noodles to clothing design to television shows. The state-owned sectors also faced daunting competition from private and foreign businesses. For the first time since 1949, private business was allowed to develop almost entirely outside of state control. Initially, private business mainly took the form of getihu, or small business undertaken by a single individual or household. The getihu dealt mainly in service industries such as restaurants, in distribution, or in small-scale production. By the late 1980's, however, privatization had extended to allow manufacturing and large enterprises to be privately-owned. (49)

        The economic system of rural China was also restructured. The communes established in the late 1950's were dissolved, and production shifted to family units. The land was divided up and distributed to individual households to farm, and the level of autonomy and security over land tenure made it the equivalent of private ownership. Some of the more successful households reinvested their earnings in purchasing the rights to more land or in establishing their own rural industrial enterprises. Some Party oversight of agricultural production was nonetheless exercised on the village and township level. On the local level, government authority tends to be very informal, and the degree of official control varies greatly between townships. Generally speaking, however, household were given a large degree of control over production and profits. (50)

        The reforms marked a shift in the government attitude towards the pursuit and utilization of private wealth. In addition, the ideological stance towards what did and did not constitute acceptable behavior on the part of the individual citizen was likewise transformed. The tenants of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought stipulated that every individual act of enjoyment detracted from their participation in and appreciation of the goals and glories of the masses. Rather, the individual should sacrifice and deny himself in order to strive for the greater good of the whole. Any hobbies, any interests, or consumption of music, art, or literature that was not explicitly Communist in origin and intent was considered bourgeois and individualist. It was asserted that "pursuing a hobby may sap one's will to make progress. (51) As Orville Schell explained,

        The Chinese Communist Revolution, which stressed sacrifice and hard work, left little room for types of enjoyment that smacked in any way of self indulgence. Mao's...notion that one's primary duty was to serve others rather than oneself militated against the idea of recreation as a form of individual enjoyment. (52)

        The new economic values of post-reform China were a far cry from Maoist asceticism. "To get rich is glorious" was the leading slogan, and self indulgence was proclaimed a form of promoting socialism and the country. Similar to "trickle-down" economics, the logic of the Deng reforms suggested that the success of individual entrepreneurs would contribute to the economic progress of the entire nation. Along with the traditional "model soldier" and "model worker", propaganda departments began to also herald the "10,000 yuan household". Materialism and leisure were thus not only tolerated but implicitly encouraged, and every household rushed to purchase the status symbols that quickly became considered necessities.

        A number of enterprises and projects emerged to accommodate the new demand for leisure activities. Although the majority of these were targeted at wealthy foreign businessmen and overseas Chinese tourists, with costs prohibitive for the average Chinese, other industries targeted the general public. These included the television and music industries, discussed in Chapters four and five, respectively. Colleges and work units began hosting informal dances for young Chinese men and women to waltz the night away. Discos and Karaoke clubs proliferated in every city, and many restaurants also set up private rooms with Karaoke machines in order to capitalize on the burgeoning public enthusiasm. More traditional Chinese pursuits, such as cards and mahjong, which had long been officially discouraged as "feudal" and "bourgeois," likewise re-emerged.

        The relaxation of official attitudes was accompanied by the relatively dramatic increase in individual free time created by the economic reforms. The demands of work units upon their members' time and attention was reduced by the decline of political meetings and non-work related duties. The rising availability of labor-saving technology in households also expanded free time. Some utilized the extra time to launch businesses on the side, but must enjoyed the opportunity to pursue leisure activities. In 1980, the average Chinese had two hours and 21 minutes of free time each day. Two years later average free time had risen to three hours and 26 minutes. This number dropped slightly to three hours and sixteen minutes in 1984, but in 1986 it rose to three hours and 59 minutes. In 1988, the average daily leisure time was four hours and 31 minutes, and in 1991 it was estimated at four hours and 48 minutes. (53)

        The expansion of free time was often far greater for the few who left their state jobs altogether and ventured completely into the realm of private enterprise. Such workers not experienced a greater flexibility of schedule; they also had increased freedom over what activities they pursued in their free time. This liberty allowed a blossoming of creativity, as evidenced by the significant proportion of newly emergent writers, artists, and rock musicians in China who were self-employed. Even those who did not seek to enter artistic fields enjoyed the absence of official interference in private activities that self-employment promised. For example, one 20 year-old man interviewed by Chinese Youth explained that he had gone into business for himself selling clothing in order to be able to pursue his hobby of break dancing. (54)

        Most significant to the process of developing a Chinese public that could actively participate in a mass-media based popular culture was the rise in income as a result of reform. The overall standard of living in China more than doubled between 1978 and 1990. Between 1978 and 1990, disposable income in China grew at an annual rate of 7.2 percent, three and a half times the growth rate of the previous two decades. Most of the growth occurred during the first half of the 1980s, the same period when most forms of popular culture in China began to emerge. Between the years of 1978 and 1985, disposable income in China grew at the rate of 11.7 percent per annum. (55)

        Although subsidies for basic expenditures were reduced, the percentage of household income expended upon them nevertheless declined. In rural areas, spending on food which had consumed 59.7 percent of average household income in 1981 had been lowered to 55.4 percent in 1985 and down to 51.7 percent in 1990. (56) In urban households, food expenses went from 56.7 percent in 1981 to 46.8 percent and 46.6 percent in 1985 and 1990, respectively. (57) Housing went up somewhat in the countryside, although this was mainly because rural dwellers were newly allowed to purchase or build their own homes. Housing used 9.8 percent of rural household income in 1981, and rose to 11.7 percent in 1985 and 12.0 percent in 1990. (58) City housing dwindled from 1.4 percent to 1.1 percent between 1981 and 1985. Inflation in the late 1980s, however influenced city housing relatively dramatically, and the urban housing expenditures rose to 2.7 percent. (59)

        The overall decline in spending on basic necessities freed up income to be used on consumer items. Chinese began to refocus their spending from basic needs to consumer goods, many of which had not been previously available. Purchase of goods in rural households rose from using 10.2 percent of income in 1981 to 12.5 percent in 1985 and 14.0 in 1990. (60) Urban household expenditures on consumer goods went from 18.6 percent in 1981 to 26.7 percent in 1985, and then declined somewhat to 23.2 percent in 1990. (61)

        The increase in available income corresponded to an increase in the goods available for purchase in China. Both what was available and degree of selection expanded remarkably due to both the opening up of China to imported goods and the growth of domestic production. In previous decades, consumption was strictly limited by non-price rationing, and the average household could not purchase most goods. (62) Most durable goods, ranging from sewing machines to televisions to automobiles, were available only to high-ranking officials, and the supply was limited even for them.

        Economic reform brought a relative wealth of choice to the Chinese consumer. Entrepreneurs filled streets throughout the county with stands, carts, even bicycle racks displaying their assortment of goods. Official free markets began offering a previously undreamed of variety of clothing, housewares, and appliances. Even state-owned stores and suppliers, their subsidies cut off and faced with stiff competition, began to improve the design, color, and quality of their products. Relaxation of price controls brought supply into accord with demand, and the long lines and shortages of goods characteristic of the Maoist era were gradually eliminated.

        Chinese production of consumer goods, both for export and domestic use, skyrocketed. Plants and factories proliferated throughout China. Within the Special Economic Zones, a variety of industries were launched, and light manufacturing sprung up even in the countryside. Many of these enterprises tailored their products to meet rising consumer demand for everything ranging from blue jeans to washing machines, from watches to transistor radios, and from bicy

       cles to television sets. Television sets were the foremost durable consumer good of the early eighties in terms of both their proliferation and their significance as a status symbol. The expansion of television production in the late 1970s and early 1980s is representative of broader trends of commodity output. At the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Hua Guofang suggested that the 1979 production of black-and-white television sets should increase to 1.2 million.

        Hua's encouragement of television production met with a better fate than his political career. The State Statistical Bureau estimated that Chinese production of .84 million television sets in 1978 grew 157.1 percent to 1.33 million sets in 1979. (63) This was only the beginning. The Beijing Review of 3 March 1980 announced two new production lines constructed that year in Beijing, which would together produce 240,000 12-inch black-and-white sets a year. A new Tianjin plant would produce 60,000 sets a year, and a joint-venture factory in Xianyang, Shaanxi opened with plans of using Japanese technology to produce 960,000 color television sets. (64) As of 1982, China had over 40 enterprises involved in manufacturing television sets. (65)

        The combination of the above four factors: official tolerance of leisure, the increase in free time, the rise of expendable income, and the increase in goods available, resulted in the emergence of a vibrant consumer economy in China. Most Chinese directed their newly expanded incomes towards the purchase of consumer goods. Average material consumption per capita rose from 216 yuan in 1978 to 398 yuan in 1985, at an annual growth rate of 9.1 percent. Per capita consumption continued to grow, reaching 486 yuan in 1990. (66)

        The existence of modern popular culture is contingent upon the presence of a strong culture of consumption. Only when the users of mass cultural products consider their consumption of said products as a point of personal and group identification is a mass culture considered "popular" as well. Much of China's new prosperity has been redirected into the individual accumulation of the products of popular culture, both entertainment-related and beyond. Chinese households almost uniformly spent beyond their means on products such as televisions, VCRs and stereos. (67) Even more practical goods became part of the popular consumer enthusiasm. Household appliances, such as washing machines, sewing machines, and refrigerators, became valued as much for their social significance as for their practical use.

        As basic a necessity as clothing became part of the culture of consumption. Liberalization allowed much greater freedom in style of dress, although China remained and remains relatively conservative and rigid on matters of personal appearance. Influenced partly by Western fashion standards, clothing manufacturers began to produce an assortment of new styles of clothing based on what was popularly considered "fashionable." While many Chinese fashions would be considered unappealing if not strange by American standards, to the Chinese consumer they offered a refreshing variety following decades of austere Mao suits.

        The appearance of Western-influenced fashion was greeted with great enthusiasm by Chinese. Women began wearing dresses, skirts, and sun hats, and calf-length nylons became ubiquitous. Random English words emblazoned on tight-fitting tee-shirts or knit sweaters also proliferated. Make-up and permanents became common fashion statements. Even cosmetic surgery became available and acceptable Men began wearing xizhuang, or Western business suits, although the Chinese interpretation of the suit initially differed greatly from the original. Imported and domestically produced blue jeans, or niuzaiku (literally "cowboy pants"), became the standard casual dress for men and women alike. (68) Presently, "traditional" Chinese clothing and the once universal Mao jacket and caps can only be found in souvenir shops for foreign tourists. Western-inspired fashions, on the other hand, fill the department shops, the stands, and the alleyway clothing markets that can be found every few blocks in modern Beijing.

        The "freedom to have fun" was combined with the freedom to consume, and much of Chinese consumption was directed at durable household goods. In the 1980's, most Chinese households purchased appliances such as washers, sewing machines, cassette players and, above all, television. Modern popular culture could not have emerged without the popularization of television and stereo ownership. By the late 1980's, almost every urban household and many rural households had acquired an audiocassette recorder/playback unit. In addition to allowing more varied musical consumption than permitted by radio, most audiocassette units came equipped with dubbing facilities for tape copying. Most early imported music as well as underground Chinese music was initially distributed almost entirely through individual borrowing and copying. (69)

        The skyrocketing of television ownership was among the most significant tangible results of the reforms. During the early 1980's, in a phenomena similar to the U.S. in the 1950's, the majority of Chinese households purchased a television set. (70) In 1970, one person in 16,400 owned a television set. In 1979, 1.42 million sets were sold, a 200 percent increase from the previous year, and by 198 one in every 280 people in China owned a television set. (71) Rural families started purchasing TV sets at a high rate beginning in 1984. By 1986, 95 percent of urban families owned at least one set. (72) In 1990, 74 percent of all households in China owned a television set. (73) There were 166 million sets in Chinese homes, which translated into a nationwide viewership of over 600 million. There was one television set for every eight people in all of China, and in cities there was one TV for every three or four urban residents. (74)

        The ethic of consumerism has infiltrated most aspects of leisure and entertainment. The urge to accumulate possessions can be seen in the fad of amateur collecting that has sprung up in urban China. In Shanghai, for example, an estimated 100,000 people have begun collecting sundries such as stamps, model ships and abacuses. Upwards of a million Shanghai residents have also taken up breeding small animals such as birds, fish or crickets. The consumerist trend is similarly illustrated by such enthusiastic pursuits- as "qigong fever," "keep-fit classes fever," "dressmaking fever," and the revival of mahjong. (75)

        Many of the objects of Chinese consumerism were Western cultural commodities that sneaked in as a result of the "open door" policy. Countless more were not actually Western products but unique Chinese interpretations of concepts with foreign origins. The mere perception of something as "foreign" or "Western" was generally sufficient to make it considered "cool" and thus wildly popular in Chinese consumption culture. In an anonymous interview, one person observed

       , Here on the mainland, the psychology of the people is such that they would rather hear Hong Kong singers than mainland singers. I can tell a mainland singers from a Hong Kong or Taiwanese singer at once. If Taiwanese and mainland singers are both available, people will prefer the Taiwanese singer. If there is a movie or a television show with American, Taiwanese, or Hong Kong songs, people will flock to see it. (76)

        The Chinese obsession with things foreign has taken many incarnations ranging from everything from Christianity to billiards and video games. One of the leading expressions of this is the wide and officially endorsed popularity of foreign dance styles. Ballroom dancing has become the most acceptably forms of dance, with ji-ta-ba (jitterbug), tan-ge (tango), lun-ba (rumba), wa-er-si (waltz), and fu-ke-si-si-bu (fox-trot) entering the lexicon of daily use. Most college campus offer weekly ballroom dances, and even the Communist Party sponsors "dance parties" around the new year. Official Party newspapers and periodicals have run positive articles about the dance craze. One article in Renmin ribao, "Young and Old Dance Away Their Spare Time," explained,

        Things have happened in many places that might have bewildered many Chinese a few years ago. Freshmen in the Beijing Youth Institute of Politics are now required to attend the college's ballroom dance lectures. (77)

        Disco culture has also become popular, especially among urban youth. Glitzy di-si-ke- clubs were first established in large urban hotels to accommodate foreign businessmen and tourists. These earned the attention of local residents, and local dance clubs within the range of the average Chinese income level were established. In the midst of the 1987 crackdown, the Party lifted the ban on underground dance halls, which have since become numerous. Guangzhou alone had over 500 dance halls by late 1987. (78) Disco dancing, which originally was considered a part of the rebellious youth, culture has become mainstream. It has even become popular with the elderly, and disco routines are now offered as an exercise alternative to tai chi. Many seniors rise early to exercise along with the television show Laonian Disco (Old People's Disco). (79) The instructor of a disco class in a seniors' home explained,

        Several years ago, disco in China interested very few young citizens and was deemed indecent by most others, especially the old. Now it is popular among city folk and is fashionable in the countryside. We hope the courses may rouse the elderly's interest in disco music and dance, thereby enriching their lives and making their families more harmonious. (80)

        Even breakdancing hit China after the movie "Breakdance" was shown in China in late 1980's. An article in Beijing Review reaffirmed worried parents of young dancers that breakdancing was a positive trend because the reforms permit "the freedom to have fun". (81)

        Youth attitudes towards disco and breakdancing are indicative of the associations that Chinese typically have with things Western. Western ideology represents not so much principles, standards or ideas as a way of life. The West is believed to be characterized by an affluent lifestyle of high material comfort and personal freedom. (82)
Footnotes for Chapter 3 46. Barme, Geremie and Jaivin, Linda (eds.), New Ghosts, Old Dreams: Chinese Rebel Voices, (New York, Random House) 1992, p. 157.
47. Shanor, Constance and Shanor, Donald, China Today, (New York: St. Martin's Press) 1995, p. 130.
48. Cheng, Hangsheng, "A Mid-Course Assessment of China's
Economic Reform," in Canyon, A.M. (ed.), Assessment of China into the 21st Century, (New York: Nova Science Publishers) 1997.
49. Young, Susan, "Wealth But Not Security: Attitudes towards private business in the 1980s," in Watson, Andrew (ed.), Economic Reform and Social Change in China, (New York: Routledge) 1992, p. 63-64.
50. An in-depth analysis of economic authority in contemporary Chinese agricultural production can be found in Watson, Andrew, "The Management of the Rural Economy: The institutional parameters," in Watson (1992), p. 171-199.
51. Bai Ye, "Zouchu geren zhuyi xiaotiandi" (Do Away with Individualism), Zhongguo Qingnian, December 1963, as cited in Wang, Shaoguang, "The politics of private time: changing leisure patterns in urban China," Davis, Deborah S., Kraus, Richard, Naughton, Barry and Perry, Elizabeth J. (eds.), Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The potential for autonomy and community in post-Mao China, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press) 1995, p. 155.
52. Schell, Orville, Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform, (New York: Doubleday), 1989, p. 62.
53. Wang (1995) p. 158.
54. Zheng, Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese Youth), v5 1988, p. 35. 55. Chai, Joseph C.H., "Consumption and Living Standards in China," The China Quarterly, p.723.
56. This is with holding constant at 1981 prices. Using 1990 prices, the statistics change to 57.8% for 1985 and 54.9% for 1990. Chai, p. 30.
57. Again using 1981 prices. With 1990 prices, these change to 52.3% in 1985 and 54.2% in 1990.
58. At 1990 prices, 12.4% and 12.9% for 1985 and 1990, respectively.
59. At 1990 prices, 1.0% in 1985 and 2.3% in 1990.
60. 11.4% in 1985 and 11.9% in 1990 using 1990 prices.
61. At 1990 prices, 23.8% in 1985 and 19.3% in 1990.
62. Chai, p. 724.
63. Howkins, John, Mass Communication in China, (New York: Annenberg/ Longman Communication Books) 1982, p. 32.
64. As cited in Howkins, p. 33.
65. Howkins, p. 34.
66. Chai, p. 722.
67. Chu, Godwin C. and Jun, Yanan, The Great Wall in Ruins: Communication and Cultural Change in China, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press) 1993, p. 84-85.
68. Schell, p. 86-87, 80, 106.
69. Lull, James, China Turned On: Television, reform, and resistance, (New York: Routledge)1991, p. 131.
70. Ibid., p. 20.
71. Xinhua News Agency (18 February 1980 and 30 April 1980), cited in Howkins.
72. Lull, p. 22-23.
73. Chai, p. 747.
74. Zha, Jianying, China Pop, (New York: The New York Press), p. 34.
75. Wang, p. 164-165.
76. Brace, Tim, "Popular Music in Contemporary Beijing: Modernism and Cultural Idenity," Asian Music, vXXII n2 (Spring/Summer 1991) p. 49.
77. Schell, 353.
78. Ibid., 352.
79. Lull, p. 67.
80. Schell, p. 354.
81. Lull, p. 131.
82. Chu and Jun, p. 13.

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