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Chapter VI
'Spiritual Pollution' and Chinese Politics


Chinese possess a rich and precious cultural heritage. But some people who advocate national nihilism debase and negate China by calling for a wholesale Westernization of China. This is borgeois liberalism, to which the people and the masses are opposed. - Wang Zhen, 27 December 1986 (208)

     The attitude of the Chinese Communist Party towards popular culture was and remains ambivalent and often contradictory. The proliferation of television into Chinese homes was heralded as progress and a mark of the success of the economic reforms, and the government utilized television to propagate its cultural and political agenda. On the other hand, the Party occasionally denounced television's drain upon public productivity and the negative influence of some programs. Tongsu singers associated with the People's Liberation Army performance troupe could be censured for hints of sexuality in their performances. The government's perspective was also inclined to change dramatically from one year to the next. Inconsistency on the part of the CCP stemmed equally from division in the ranks of the upper Party hierarchy and events occurring throughout China. The Party's continuing belief in the significance of culture was emphasized as the government targeted mass culture whenever it felt that its predominant position was challenged.

     In addition to the economic components, the reforms of Deng Xiaoping involved a transition of power within the party. Younger leaders with technical or scientific experience were considered crucial to the formulation of sound economic policies. Particularly in the higher ranks of the Party, the young reformers were crucial in supporting the modernization policies and counterbalancing the entrenched conservatives. The "old guard" of the CCP, comprised of Deng Xiaoping's contemporaries from the revolutionary era, were largely uncomfortable with the economic reforms, and firmly opposed any sort of political reform. Deng Xiaoping himself stood somewhere in the middle, pushing economic reform but not to fast and without political concessions. Deng was unapologetic about playing the two groups against each other, and the constant pull of power between the factions resulted in the ongoing fluctuation in Party policy towards popular culture.

     When Deng first ascended to power, he brought with him a number of relatively young, reform minded cadres, foremost among them Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Although younger than the Revolutionary generation, both had been with the Communist Party from its early days. Both, like Deng himself, had been targets of persecution during the Cultural Revolution. Along with less prominent leaders such as Zhu Houzi and Hu Qili, Zhao and Hu pushed forward the process of economic reforms. The reformers were also responsible for promoting a new "double hundred" policy with the purpose of stimulating discussion and building consensus about the methods and directions of reforms. Like the first "double hundred" policy, some of the flowers that bloomed were not to the liking of the leadership and prompting a conservative backlash. (209)

     The conservative hardliners, a group of octogenarian peasant revolutionaries, were headed by leaders such as Wang Zhen, Deng Liqun, Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen and Hu Qiaomu. This group was distinct from the old-style Maoists who had been largely removed from the Party following the arrest and trial of the Gang of Four. Most of the conservatives in the Political Bureau during the 1980's had, like Deng, been targets of attack during the Cultural Revolution. For the most part, they supported reform in theory. However, the pace of reform and the shape that it began to take offended the sensibilities of the elderly revolutionaries. The indulgent materialism of the emerging consumerism contrasted with the rigorously ideological and self-sacrificing ethic that had characterized their era. The hardliners worried that reform was eradicating not only the values of and accomplishments of socialism but also the better aspects of traditional Chinese culture.

     Deng Xiaoping stood in the middle of yet somehow above the conflicts of policy, ideology and personality that characterized the Political Bureau under his direction. He facilitated and sometimes initiated the attacks upon one faction or another, but his position was rarely questioned, and the few who dared to challenge him suffered the consequences. Deng once explained his position between the factions.

Some look upon me as a 'reformer' and others as a 'conservative'. I am a reformer, that's true, but if one who advocates upholding the Four Cardinal Principles is a conservative, then I am a conservative. So, under the circumstances, I'm neither a reformer nor a conservative. To be more exact, I am an advocate of seeking truth from facts. (210)

     The policy makers on both sides of the ideological divide were aware of many of the contradictions of reform and the possible social and political dangers inherent to the emerging cultural consumerism. Before and throughout the campaigns of 1983, 1987 and 1989 targeted the aspects of culture considered dangerous, the Party attempted to offer a proper and socialist alternative to the materialist hedonism of popular culture. Building socialist "spiritual civilization" was considered a means of establishing the idea of Communism even as its application was largely abandoned. The Party moreover hoped that "spiritual civilization" could positively fill the needs being satiated by consumerism and popular culture. "Spiritual civilization" was considered the best weapon in combating the "Three Confidences Crisis," of belief in the Party, belief in socialism, and trust of cadres. (211) The idea was proposed in September 1979 by Ye Jianying as a solution to the national crisis of faith and to balance out the reformers' focus on economic growth. At the first plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress, Deng threw his support to the concept of establishing a "socialist spiritual civilization" (shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming). (212)

     A handful of propaganda drives attempted to popularize the idea of "spiritual civilization." Every March was declared "National Ethics and Courtesy Month." The people were admonished to pursue "the five stresses, four beauties and three loves," which consisted of stressing decorum, manners, hygiene, discipline and morality, seeking to accomplish and recognize beauty in one's mind, language, behavior and environment, and loving the Party, the motherland and socialism. The official media lauded families that followed and represented the "five goods": being diligent at work and at study, showing consideration for family members and neighbors, practicing family planning and paying attention to the education of one's children, exercising discipline and observing the law, and evidencing courteous public behavior. (213)

     Calls for "spiritual civilization" provided an undercurrent to the second plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress in October of 1983. Although 1983 had witnessed an unprecendentedly liberal interpretation of the "double hundred" policy, hints of an impending backlash had mounted throughout the year. For example, in January the government had announced the strict if unenforceable policy of banning the importation of all foreign records, cassette tapes and video tapes. (214) During the second plenum, Deng attempted "Party consolidation" through a number of steps, including purifying the Party of the Cultural Revolution remnants of the "three types of people," comprised of those "who rose to prominence by following the counter-revolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in 'rebellion;' those who are seriously factionalist in their ideas; and those who indulged in beating, smashing and looting." (215) Violent and non-violent crime had been on the rise the previous year, and thus the second plenum included a crackdown on crime. The attack on crime also targeted influences that were seen as contributing to criminal behavior.

     The assortment of perceived influences included abstract humanism and individualism, theories of socialist alienation, and "spiritual pollution." In his speech to the second plenum, Deng Xiaoping stressed the need for cadres to,

...enhance their understanding of the theories of Marxism-Leninist and Mao Zedong Thought and the policies based on them, raise their sense of dedication to the revolutionary cause and their sense of political responsibility, dare to combat all hostile forces disrupting socialism, fight against decadent bourgeois ideology, against acts of creating spiritual pollution and against the abuse of power and position for personal gains so that they will set a good example for the broad masses of Party members and guide the masses to make efforts to become people with high ideals and morality, cultural knowledge and sense of discipline. (216)
In his speech, Deng went on to provide what would become the official definition of spiritual pollution.

The substance of spiritual pollution as disseminating all varieties of corrupt and decadent ideologies of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes and disseminating sentiments of distrust towards the socialist and communist cause and to the Communist Party leadership." (217)

     The questionable link between "spiritual pollution" and crime was reiterated by Xu Dehung, chair of Jiu San Society.

The influence of decadent bourgeois ideology and its corrosion have become more serious, and certain books, magazines, audio tapes and videotapes which spread pornographic, absurd and reactionary materials have become important causes of juvenile delinquency, and liberalization concepts of the bourgeoisie and all kinds of corrupt ideologies have invaded our society's ideological, theoretical, literary and art spheres. (218)

     The first two factors were based in the major ideological critiques being made at the time of the government and society by intellectuals. Their association with "spiritual pollution" made little sense except for the political practicality of negative association. "Spiritual pollution," narrowly defined, originally referred to the pornographic videos and magazines that were being smuggled into the country illegally. It also included the broad category of things that the Party defined as pornographic, which could apply to music, movies, books, magazines, photographs, and almost any medium that possessed a capacity to hint at sex. The party ideologues attempted to clearly delineate what constituted "spiritual pollution." On October 28, Deng Liqun met with reporters from Associated Press to explain the scope of the campaign, which considered pornography, songs popular in Western bars and brothels, and explicit sex bad, while allowing nudity in fine art, lyric songs and light music. (219) Deng Liqun defined spiritual pollution as,

…things that are obscene, barbarous, or reactionary; vulgar taste in artistic performances; efforts to seek personal gain, and indulgence in individualism, anarchism, and liberalism; and writing articles or delivering speeches that run counter to the country's social system. (220)

     The Party criticisms of humanism and alienation theory were directed at specific writers and intellectuals. The anti-spiritual pollution campaign was likewise aimed at the creators of cultural works, as well as at discovering, confiscating and destroying materials considered pornographic. The Guangming Daily quoted Deng Xiaoping as blaming the existence of spiritual pollution of artists and writers who tend to "deprecate Chinese tradition" in favor of the "modernist schools" and "blindly to imitate and fanatically to pursue foreign culture." (221) Spiritual pollution was also linked to "cultural contamination" from foreign cultural products. Deng warned of the risks of the commoditization (shangpinhua) of cultural and spiritual products, and reminded artists of the primacy of political and social duty over artistic license.

     A Renmin Ribao editorial elaborated the charges of spiritual pollution being aimed at writers.

Some people use their unhealthy ideology, works and performances to pollute the people's souls. They have expressed indifference to the Party's slogan for art and literature to serve the people and socialism, and the socialist direction of art and literature. Some go so far as to fundamentally deny the necessity of creating artistic models, they take and moreover advocate the "three nos" (no theme, no plot, no characters) as the direction for creation. They relish in writing about the seamy side, the dark side, even causing confusion and distorting things of revolutionary history and reality. Some people propagate that the highest objective of literature and art is "self-expression," or they call for abstract human nature and humanism, think that so-called alienation of man under the conditions of socialism should be a theme for creative work. A few works even propagandize sex and religion. (222)

     Under the guidance of Deng Liqun, the anti-spiritual pollution campaign was very broadly interpreted and implemented. In addition to the proliferation of pornographic films and videotapes, targets included the "worship of individualism," economic opportunism, uncritical admiration of Western thought and culture, and the resurgence of supersticiousness. Also criticized were the use of "Hong Kong-style" advertisements that fooled customers into buying "trash," the taste for "decadent" music, and the wearing of Western-style haircuts, clothing, or high-heeled shoes. There were reports of vigilantes harassing people with unusually long hair or unconventional clothing. A notice was posted on the gate to the headquarters of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee declared, "No admittance to persons with hair too long, skirts to short, slacks too tight, or face powdered and rouged." Local authorities in the city of Lanzhou warned against, "wearing mustaches and whiskers, singing unhealthy songs, being undisciplined, and not keeping one's mind at work." (223) On the local and unit level, activities were organized to guard against incursions by the nefarious influences of spiritual pollution. Cultural, sports, and reading centers were opened, student organizations were more closely monitored, and Army and police units organized study sessions.

     Another primary target was advertising, particularly for and by foreign companies. Domestic advertising firms were criticized for succumbing to Western attitudes of giving profits priority over the well-being of the masses. The accusation was made that,

Some, in order to earn foreign exchange, have no scruples about producing big propaganda on behalf of foreign businesses. Some place advertising for foreign businesses in overly prominent places. Some impugn the Han people's dignity. Some use every capitalist means possible to attract customers. (224)
Particular advertisements were singled out for being prurient and thus "unhealthy" or "spiritually polluting." A number of advertising agencies were fined or shut down as punishment for their involvement in producing vulgarity that ran counter to the "spiritual civilization" and for working under a "profits-are-everything" attitude. (225)

     The attacks upon the influence of foreign business was one of many examples of how the campaign against spiritual pollution began to be applied to a broader range of targets than originally intended. Hardliners seeking to consolidate their own political security wielded the campaign against the reform policies, and some successful farmers and businessmen were subject to harassment. Even before such direct attacks were launched against the reforms, the possibility that the anti-spiritual pollution campaign could expand into broad political turmoil had frightened peasant farmers and nervous foreign investors. As early as late October, Hu and Zhao began to voice their reservations about the campaign. In November, a number of foreign business interests placed impending agreements with China on hold due to their fears that the situation would escalate. This allowed Hu and Zhao to convince Deng that the campaign had gone to far. The battle against spiritual pollution was brought to an abrupt halt, and in the aftermath Deng Liqun barely escaped being removed from leadership. (226)

     General Political Department head Yu Qiuli gave a speech that signaled the death knell of the anti-spiritual pollution campaign.

     It is not right to speak of wearing high-heeled shoes, getting permanents, wearing sunglasses, and smoking filtered cigarettes as manifestations of spiritual pollution... There will be chaos if everything is regarded as spiritual pollution.
     Some people have arbitrarily expanded the scope of investigations and seizures. The have confiscated magazines, artistic photographs, and literary works, even photographs of soldiers' families and friends. This is clearly mistaken.
     It is absolutely necessary to seek truth from facts and draw clear limits. We must not indiscriminately turn into spiritual pollution everything that one has not seen before, does not care for, or is unaccustomed to, as some comrades have done. (227)

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© L Movius, April 1998
Please do not cite withouth permission.

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