A second campaign launched in January 1987 targeted the concept of "bourgeois liberalization," which like spiritual pollution originated from the fear that Western concepts would negatively impact Chinese social, political, and cultural life. Popular culture in 1983 had been in its infancy, with relatively little to attack. By 1987, however, popular cultural was pervasive and thriving. Although the scope of the 1987 campaign was more limited than in 1983, its political and cultural ramifications were more far reaching.

     The campaign was the Party response to a series of student demonstrations that occurred in the fall of 1986 throughout China. A demonstration took place that fall in a Hefei. Then, in November, the American "surf-rock" band "Jan and Dean" came to China for a concert tour. The were the first well-known American group to perform in China, and the turn out for their performances was overwhelming. One concert was held in the Shanghai stadium, and all 18,000 seats were filled to capacity. During the Shanghai performance, some enthusiastic audience members got up and began to dance in the aisles. Security took no action at the time, but afterwards they sought to arrest a few of the dancers, including a student from Jiatong University. The student protested his innocence and resisted arrest, which led to a police beating in full view of the people leaving the concert.

     Other Jiaotong students were among the witnesses to the beating, and they petitioned the municipal government to punish the police officers involved and to enact measures to prevent it from happening again. The demonstrations already occurring inspired them to broaden their petition to include concerns regarding the slowness of reform, the poor living conditions at universities, boring curricula, inflation, and Party corruption. On 18 December 1986, Shanghai mayor Jiang Zemin met with over three thousand students at Jiatong. Jiang denied that the police brutality had occurred, and demanded that the students refrain from putting up character posters and interfering with reform. The following day, students began marching, and by 20 December over 30,000 students from every university in Shanghai had congregated downtown. Traffic stalled, the city shut down, and a few cars were overturned and burned. (228)

     By December 23, the unrest in Shanghai had settled, and the students returned to their campuses. The Party hoped that the protests had faded for good. However, word of mouth and outside media broadcasts into China by the BBC and Voice of America spread news of the Shanghai protests to other cities. To the Party's dismay, he same day that the Shanghai protests faded, protests in Beijing began. The Beijing protests began with thousands of students marching from Qinghua University, and a handful of students were arrested. The protests escalated over the following week, and culminated in 1 January 1987 march upon Tiananmen Square. After early January, however, the student marches in Beijing and on 150 campuses throughout the country ended peacefully and anticlimatically as the students returned home for vacation. (229)

     On 27 December 1986 Deng Xiaoping received a visit from a group of hardliners from the Political Bureau. The delegation consisted of Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen, Hu Qiaomu, Bo Yibo, Deng Liqun, Yang Shankan and Yu Qiuli. The hardliners berated Deng for Hu Yaobang's history of misconduct, and blamed Hu particularly for his failure to control the demonstrations. They requested that Deng immediately dismiss Hu from his post as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. (230) Deng demurred their suggestions, but at a special meeting of the Political Bureau on 30 December, Deng directly criticised Hu for failing to control dissidents or prevent the demonstrations. In the weeks that followed, Deng requested Hu's resignation three times, and each time Hu refused. Finally, at a 16 January meeting of the Political Bureau, Hu Yaobang was forced to resign.

     On 17 January, the Party released Central Document No. 3 (1987) detailing six reasons for Hu's dismissal. It stipulated that Hu had resisted the campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization, and had thus contributed to the student movement and the calls for "total Westernization." His leadership in the Party rectification campaign had been wanting. Hu's economic policies had focused excessively on stimulating and satisfying consumer demand, thus accelerating growth to a rate where it was impossible to "lay the ideological groundwork." The document further asserted that Hu had not comported himself properly, that he had been indiscreet in foreign affairs, and that he acted without Party authorization. (231)

     The resignation of Hu Yaobang signaled a power shift in favor of the hardliners. Over the following months, hardliners used their advantage to crack down on dissident intellectuals and forces that they deemed to be "bourgeois." Before being forced from the Party along with intellectual Fang Lizhi and reporter Liu Binyan, writer Wang Ruowang observed wryly,

The Maoist holdovers are lunging for the big kill. Throughout the country, reform-minded people are scurrying for cover. The very fate of reform is at stake. (232)

     With their newly regained control of power, the hardliners launched a crackdown on cultural and political influences that they considered damaging. The listed targets of their campaign were the concepts of "bourgeois liberalism" and "wholesale Westernization," both of which they considered destabilizing forces. The hardliners asserted that the application of Western technology and economic system had brought with it Western cultural and political concepts. Western political ideas were blamed for the students' behavior. Western cultural infiltration was evidenced by the proliferation and popularity of both imported and domestic cultural products that the conservatives considered unhealthy for the public consumption. This latter category engulfed virtually every facet of popular culture.

     "Bourgeois liberalization" generally referred to attempts by reformers to apply criticisms based upon Western political theory to the problems in Chinese politics and society. In February, Wang Zhen offered his definition of "bourgeois liberalization."

For some time in the past a trend of 'bourgeois liberalization' has prevailed. One of its major aspects is the denial of our nation's great history and record. Some people have claimed that nothing was any good in China and have tried to import everything from abroad...But the Chinese people have their own self-respect and sense of national pride. They regard their aspiration to love the motherland and their complete dedication to it as a tremendous source of glory, and any action that harms the interest, dignity, and honor of the socialist motherland is a disgusting shame. (233)

"We must have strong national self-esteem and self-confidence. We should not improperly belittle ourselves and think that all things foreign are better than things Chinese; that the 'moon is rounder in foreign countries than in China.' Such people are ignorant of the history of China. (234)

     The 1987 campaign ultimately was more rhetorical than concrete, and even the terminology of the campaign was aimed at discrediting reformers and their motivations. Although the war of words waged in 1987 primarily consisted of bombastic posturing, it nevertheless illustrated that the ideological and cultural changes had frayed a very delicate nerve in the Party.

     A Renmin Ribao editorial provided a definition of "wholesale Westernization" and attempted to explain how it threatened the well-being of the country.

To think that in China during the second half of the nineteen-eighties, when the Chinese people under the Chinese Communist Party's leadership have achieved success in building a modern socialist country - a success that has attracted worldwide attention - that some people have the impudence to raise the old slogan of 'wholesale Westernization!'
     What does 'wholesale Westernization' mean? To use the words of its advocates, it means that everything in the West, including its science, technology, culture, politics, ideology, and ethics...are fair game... It means a total repudiation of the socialist system and total implementation of the capitalist system in China. No Chinese with pride, confidence, and respect for history and fact will every endorse this idea of 'wholesale Westernization.' (235)

Some of our comrades detest 'Leftist' thinking... This is understandable and should be appreciated... But these comrades turn a blind eye to bourgeois liberalization. Now is a time for them to sober up. Bourgeois liberalization is a tendency which poisons our youth, is harmful to socialist stability and unity, and disrupts our reform and 'open policy.' How can we ignore it? (236)

     The campaign itself failed to live up to the drastic pronouncements of the hardliners. Hu Yaobang was demoted from his position as leader of the Party, and the Party memberships a few prominent dissident intellectuals were revoked. The "Central Document No. 4 (1987) in March began the process of removing those with "bourgeois liberal" inclinations from prominent editorial and journalist posts. The official campaign mainly targeted newspapers and periodicals, and primarily for ideological content. (237)

     Although popular culture was a neutral factor in the ideological controversies and student demonstrations of 1986, most aspects of it fell under scrutiny in early 1987 due to its association with things Western and subversive. The attacks on popular culture occurred mainly on the decentralized level, as broad mandate of "Central Document No. 4" was conscientiously wielded by middle-level bureaucrats. Thus the campaign resulted in the censure of the more innovative artists in the state-run cultural ministries on the national and local level.

     Most tongsu songwriters reacted to the earliest signs of instability with protective self-censorship. The few that were insufficiently cautious were reprimanded by their unit or song-and-dance troupe for producing songs with lyrics that were romantic in content or ideologically questionable. It was at during this period that the conservative and therefore politically safe Revolutionary Operas resurfaced in disco form. A number of early yaogun musicians were fired from their day jobs as part of the 1987 campaign. A few of the periodicals that had begun featuring flashy covers with scantily clad women and glitzy articles about movies, music, and budding pop stars unobtrusively returned to running stories on such matters as levels of industrial production.

     As the rhetoric of the campaign would suggest, foreign influences in terms of both products and advertisements were subject to scrutiny and criticism. However, due to concerns that the economic ramifications of the campaign would resemble those of 1983, the anti-foreign rhetoric never translated into actual steps against cultural imports. The same economic motivations restrained and ultimately halted the campaign. Hardliner control was unambiguously restricted to the political and cultural realms and away from economic policy. Even the restricted campaign, however, began to negatively impact economic policy. Fears that the campaign would extend its scope and enact an all too familiar reversal of prior policies led to instability in the business and agricultural sectors. Foreign investors likewise retrenched until the political climate settled. Recognizing the damage already done, Deng Xiaoping's backing shifted away from the hardliners and back to the reformers, now led by Zhao Ziyang, who had taken over Hu Yaobang's position as General Party Secretary. By late spring 1987, the campaign had trickled to an end.

     Two years later, China drew international attention with the student demonstrations that followed in the wake of Hu Yaobang's death. The violent end of the demonstrations on 4 June was followed by the harshest political crackdown of the Deng era. In the 1983 and 1987 campaigns, caution had been exercised due to possible negative economic and political repercussions both domestically and internationally. In 1989, however, no such restraints were displayed by the government. Surprisingly, the crackdown of 1989 resulted in far lesser damage to China's popular culture. This was partially because, by 1989, popular culture had become much more firmly established than during previous campaigns, and thus more resistant to attacks. Most important, however, was the nature of the 1989 crackdown. The campaigns of 1983 and 1987 had been inherently political, but their instigators were reluctant to admit it, and thus they masked the politics under the banners of culture and ideology. In 1989, in contrast, the political motivations were obvious and unavoidable. Culture lost its utility as a scapegoat.

     Popular culture nevertheless was caught up in the tide of the wide-reaching repression of 1989, but the damage done was far less than when it was the actual target. The cracks in the government policy towards pop were apparent in such examples as the Cui Jian tour. The producers of popular culture, sensing the danger that prevailed at the time, mainly kept a low profile, but they by no means disappeared. In the months and years following the summer of 1989, the future of reforms themselves as well as their myriad results were uncertain. The hardliners reemerged and exercised far wider powers than they had previously enjoyed. Then, in mid-January of 1992, Deng Xiaoping began a tour of the Special Economic Zones in the southeastern part of the country. The trip symbolically reiterated Deng's commitment to the economic reforms, a position that had been in question over the previous few years. His public commitment was further reinforced by the assignment of Zhu Rongji to the task of establishing a Chinese stock market and dismantling unprofitable state-owned enterprises. In early May, Renmin Ribao ran an anonymous commentary calling for the country to "boldly step forward" in supporting and promoting economic reform. (238)

     At the fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992, support for reform was consolidated and its future assured. Many of the aged hardliners had finally died, and those remaining, including Deng Liqun, were forced from Party leadership. Moreover, 46 percent of the members of the new Central Committee were first time members, the average age was 56, and 84 percent were college educated. (239) Although discussion of political reform remained forbidden, supporters of reform and centrists came to dominate the Party leadership in 1992, and campaigns such as those that dotted the 1980's have become obsolete. Although banners and signs championing "spiritual civilization" still decorate Chinese cities and villages, little attempt is made to move beyond rhetoric.

     The failure of the campaigns of 1983 and 1987 is significant on a number of levels. In part, the campaigns failed because they lacked a fully supportive government, and were halted when their opportunity cost became too high. They also evidenced a misdirection of tactics. The campaigns against "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois liberalization" were both uncertain in their tactics, targeting popular culture but ultimately focusing on intellectual issues that were far removed from the cultural consumption of the average citizen. The abstract theories that the campaigns attacked were far less responsible for "spiritually polluting" the populace than the "low" culture that the public consumed in their daily lives.

     The campaigns evidenced that, even in the early 1980's, the Party had lost its capacity to stimulate an ideological fervor in the minds and souls of the public. Numerous accounts detail how most people responded to the government admonitions to promote "spiritual civilization" with indifference, fear, amusement, or even scorn. Not only was the public not sympathetic to the ideology being promoted; apart from concern about a revival of the old-style purges, they did not even take it seriously. This was partly because of the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, the wide-spread cynicism and realization of the dangers posed by ideology. It also was partly because the people had become distracted, so that Party and the state were no longer the focus of their lives. People's attitudes and priorities had shifted from ideology to family, to work, and to finding ways to enjoy their daily lives. In the battle between the Communist Party and popular culture for the public's heart, mind, and attention, popular culture had triumphed.

Endnotes, Chapter 6

208. Speaking in Zhongnanhai in response to student demonstrations in Shanghai and Beijing. As cited in Schell, Orville, Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform, (New York: Doubleday), 1989, p. 235. 209. Dittmer, Lowell, "Reform, Succession, and the Resurgence of China's Old Guard," in Leng, Shao-chuan, (ed.) Changes in China: Party, State, and Society, (New York: University Press of America) 1989, p. 50. 210. Schell, p. 325. 211. Heng, Liang and Shapiro, Judith, Cold Winds, Warm Winds: Intellectual Life in China Today, (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press) 1986,p. 49. 212. Baum, Richard, Burying Mao, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press) 1994, p. 144. 213. Gold, Thomas B., "'Just in Time!' China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984," Asian Survey, vXXIV n9 (September 1984), p. 965. 214. Heng and Shapiro, p. 42. 215. Beijing Review, No. 42, 17 October 1983, as cited in Gold, p. 949. 216. Ibid. 217. Renmin ribao 16 November 1983, as cited in Gold, p. 952. 218. Gold, p. 954. 219. Ibid., p. 964. 220. Ibid., p. 957. 221. China Quarterly, v97 (Sept - Dec 1983) p. 160-169. 222. Renmin Ribao, 31 October 1983, as cited in Gold p. 971. 223. Baum, p. 160. 224. Stross, Randall, "The Return of Advertising in China: A Survey of the Ideological Reversal," The China Quarterly, v124, September 1990, p. 496-497. 225. Ibid., p. 499. 226. Baum, p. 163. 227. Ibid., p. 162. 228. Schell, p. 224-226. 229. Ibid., p. 233, 241. 230. Baum, p. 207. 231. Ibid., p. 207-208. 232. Quoted in Schell, p. 249. 233. Ibid., 227. 234. Ibid., 227. 235. Ibid., p. 276. 236. Baum, 206 237. Ibid., 211 238. Ibid., p. 342-350. 239. Ibid., p. 364-367.

Previous     Home       Article Index      Next

© L Movius, April 1998
Please do not cite withouth permission.