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Chapter VII
Popular Culture and Traditional Values

The first class of citizens are the cadres;
Young and old alike, they enjoy idle fortune.
The second class of citizens are the entrepreneurs,
With their portable telephones tucked in their belts.
The sixth class of citizens are the surgeons;
They cut open your belly, then ask for a bribe.
The eighth class are the propagandists;
Every three or four days they gorge themselves at banquets.
The ninth class of citizens are the teachers,
Whose tastebuds never experience any delicacies.
The tenth class of citizens are workers, peasants, and soldiers;
They bend their backs and bust their asses,
learning from Lei Feng.
- "New Ditty on the Ten Kinds of People,"
a popular Liumang saying (240)

    The conservative attacks upon popular culture and its Western components claimed that it would negatively influence the established Chinese social order. Although society and daily life have certainly undergone tremendous changes in the past two decades, much of the change has resulted from the economic and political rather than cultural climate. Moreover, the fundamentals of the traditional Chinese social structure have persisted despite attacks from both Communist utopianism and capitalist materialism. The Party hardliners and the creators of cultural products would both assert that popular culture has the capacity to radically and instantaneously transform, for bad or for good, the lives of its consumers. Society, however, is much more complicated and resistant to change than Madison Avenue or Renmin Ribao would be willing to admit.

    Popular culture has nevertheless managed to infiltrate virtually all aspects of Chinese life over the past two decades, and its pervasive influence has effected definite if subtle changes. The resulting alterations, however, are not so much in the social structure itself but in the values and assumptions on which that structure is based. The shift in values is accomplished through three distinct but interrelated channels. First is the portrayal of Chinese culture and society in domestically produced cultural products. Mass culture tends to both involve and distance the viewer, so that even when what is depicted strongly resembles the life and values of the audience, the viewer is able to observe and judge the actions and values in the cultural product with more objectivity than in their own lives. In Kewang, for example, although viewers identified with the Liu Huifang character precisely because of her embodiment of traditional values such as passivity and self-sacrifice, they also recognize that those same traits facilitate her eventual downfall. It is easier to criticize society as it appears on television than as it influences one's own daily life.

    Popular culture has also provided an alternative reality to Chinese society in the form of Western culture, society, and values, or at least as they are portrayed on television in China. Domestically-produced shows tend to portray the West with a tone that is at best bemused and at worst derogatory, while foreign shows normally depict a limited and often unrealistic aspect of the country in which they are set. However manufactured, Western values as perceived by Chinese place the individual over the family or society, stress independence and autonomy, and give financial profit priority over personal principle. Deep-seated social taboos are discardable, privacy is an inalienable right, and sex and sexuality are openly discussed and part of everyday life. Although shunned by the older generations, the freedom of "Western values" seem a tantalizing possibility to young Chinese who are frustrated with the restrictiveness of their society and the persistence of traditional expectations of propriety.

    Finally, a certain value system is universally inherent to popular culture itself. Unlike high culture, which is "art for art's sake," popular entertainment culture represents "art for pleasure's sake." It promises maximum enjoyment for a minimum expenditure of energy. Popular culture is socially acceptable hedonism for the masses. Popular culture offers its own version of individualism. It is not the individualism of Western values and political theory, which originates from the Calvinist work ethic and preaches an individual right to work hard and accomplish success. Rather, the individualism of popular culture is based in the alienation and "atomisation" of modern consumer society and advocates the right to have fun, and the right to be self-indulgence. This alternative modern individualism has been gradually overtaking the traditional Protestant ethic in the West, and it is beginning to challenge both traditional Confucian values and Communist "spiritual civilization" in China.

    The Chinese social structure has undergone significant change under Communist rule and since 1979. In the early decades of the People's Republic, government policy has aimed at shifting the individual's primary alliance away from the family and towards the state and the Communist Party. Under the reforms, the family has resumed its traditional centrality, due both to the relaxation of state involvement in personal life and to the government's realization of the role of the family unit in maintaining social stability. Traditional society and the Communist Party both emphasized the importance of the collective over the individual. Traditional Chinese society moreover determined the worth of the individual based upon their place in a hierarchy of positions and interrelations. Although the Communist Party prided itself on its egalitarianism, in actuality it maintained the structure of social hierarchy, and only changed the relative status of the different positions within it.

    Analyzing the impact of popular culture on Chinese society and values poses two methodological difficulties. Firstly, defining value systems without resorting to oversimplification can be problematic if not impossible. Moreover, changes within something as abstract as the values held by the members of a society do not lend themselves to easy quantification. Secondly, in as much as change has occurred, which shifts have occurred precisely as a result of the emergence of popular culture is subject to speculation. Most of the changes that have occurred in China can be attributed more to the influence of economic and political rather than cultural factors. The role of popular culture in altering the character and values of Chinese society is examined here in terms of its conveyance of Western values and its function in establishing and defining alternative subcultures.

    Chu and Jun (1995) conducted a survey of 2,000 Chinese living in urban Shanghai, in the semi-urban districts surrounding the city, and in rural villages nearby. They posed a number of questions regarding household structure, family relations, social attitudes and personal values. In the survey, Chu and Jun paid particular attention to use of the mass media as a conduit of Western culture, and for organized the responses to each question according to the respondent's level of exposure to Western influences. Their finding are cited below on questions of general attitude towards life, family hierarchy, and marriage and divorce.

    Individuals who had high levels of media exposure to Western culture tended to place a higher value on such factors as happiness, enjoyment of life, and love and friendship. Positive answers to questions such as, "Is it better to enjoy life or work hard?" and "Is it better to live happily or contribute to the society?" suggest support of individualism over traditionalism. Those with a high Western influence also evidenced less respect towards traditional values such as filial respect and chastity for women, and they tended to take more liberal positions on controversial social issues. The below chart documents the effect of Western influence on individual priorities and values.

    The extended family remains the foundation of Chinese society, and harmonious family relations are considered the top priority even for the young and Westernized. Due mainly to the housing shortage, over two-thirds of adults in China live with their parents, so that typically three generations live and interact within a single household. The most common arrangement is for newlyweds to move in with the husband's parents, and the most common form of quarrel remains the traditional differences between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. Even when not under the same roof, immediate family members remain closely in touch, typically visiting each other several times a week. Grown children continue to rely on their parents' guidance, and over 90 percent regularly solicit their opinions. Young children are expected to respect and obey their parents, and talking back is rare, although increasingly frequent with young parents. (242)

    Elders are still treated with deference and respect, and caring for elderly parents remains a sacrosanct duty that most continue to consider important. (243) The nature of respect, however, has changed. For example, it was traditionally considered disrespectful to so much as disagree with elderly relatives. Presently, most concur that it is acceptable to disagree with one elders, although most would consider it rude to argue with them. Individuals with more education or with higher levels of Western influence are, however, more likely to be willing to argue with an old person. (244)

    The traditional structure of arranged marriage was abolished under Communism, and most of the modern changes to the institution of marriage occurred prior to reform. Most couples meet at work or are introduced by friends and relatives. Although shared living arrangements provide a motive to choose a spouse acceptable to one's family, most parents expressed an unwillingness to interfere in their children's choice of spouse. Compatibility of personality has become more important to young couples than it was to previous generations, and compatibility was cited by respondents as second only to moral character in their choice of a spouse. (245)

    Incompatibility between spouses is likewise the most common source of domestic quarrels, and it is increasingly becoming a motivation for divorce. Traditionally, husbands could divorce their wives for almost any reason, especially the failure to bear a son. Even after 1949, divorce was considered shameful, and most would believe it was due to something being "wrong" with the woman. Since 1980, however, attitudes have become more understanding as the divorce rate has risen. In 1980, there were 341,000 divorces, and the number rose to over 800,000 in 1990. (246) Divorce rates have since continued to rise. In 1989, the annual divorce rate was 1.1 for every 1000 people, as compared to 17.8 marriages for 1000 people. Within certain social groups, such as urban intellectuals from the Cultural Revolution generation, the rate is disproportionately higher. A high percentage of divorces involve a "third party," or extramarital affair. (247)

    Public attitudes towards divorce have grown more understanding since 1980. In the Chu and Jun survey, respondents were asked whether a couple should file a divorce if they did not get along and had no children, and 76.4 percent responded in the affirmative. Responses were more pro-divorce from urban residents, the more educated, and those with high exposure to Western influence. In cases where the hypothetical couple had children, however, most respondents (66.2 percent) opposed divorce on the grounds of the effect it would have on the children. The only group that did not overwhelming oppose divorce when children were involved were those with high Western influence, of whom 56.9 percent believed that divorce would still be the best option.

    Despite the improvements in marital arrangements for women and the weakening of the traditional patriarchy, pronounced gender inequalities are still present in China. Within the family structure, women conduct most of the domestic chores and housework, such as cooking, cleaning, and caring for children. Traditional views on such things as women's mental and physical abilities and chastity persist. Illiteracy rates for women are twice that of men. Women comprise six percent of government ministries and twelve percent of managerial positions. (248) The "one-child" policy has proven to be a mixed blessing for women: while they are spared the burden of constant child-bearing, it infringes their ability to rise in the family hierarchy through the bearing of sons. Economic reform, rather than providing new opportunities for Chinese women, has allowed the sexism of traditional society to re-emerge. Moreover, the use of sexuality and provocative images of women in the mass media has objectified women, eroding what little respect was traditionally granted to them.

    In the Chu and Jun survey, young people were more likely than any other group to have high levels of exposure to Western culture. Even young people with relatively uninfluenced by the West were more likely than their elders to hold untraditional views. Youth, as defined in most studies, refers to the generation that was in primary school during the onset of the cultural revolution. As children, this group watched in helpless confusion as their older siblings rampaged and their parents suffered. Unimpressed by the ideological fervor of their siblings, they became very cynical at a very young age. This group was mainly in their teens during the early 1980's, and was the first generation to come of age in China under a bombardment of pop images. Youth were the leading force in producing, consuming, and participating in the early incarnations of popular culture in China. Particularly in the cities, an entire youth subculture developed which was based in and defined by popular influences.

    The youth culture was largely responsible for the initial perpetuation of the idea that Western culture, clothing and trends were "cool." Years before popular culture was adapted into the mainstream, young people were obsessed with the then taboo activities of dancing ballroom, disco and breakdancing styles. The basic generation gap was exacerbated by the degree to which social and cultural conditions had changed since their parents' era. One mother lamented the behavior of her son, a breakdancing enthusiast, who she felt she had lost forever to nefarious influences. Her confusion was shared with countless parents of post-reform teenagers.

I have lost face. I am ashamed to see my colleagues and friends. I work as a doctor in my son's school. He's obsessed by break dancing. He's got his head shaved in an eccentric way and he wears all kinds of outlandish clothes. He's made a fool of himself in front of everybody, and his behavior is causing a lot of talk. What worries me even more is that his grades are getting worse all the time. Last term, he only passed physical education and flunked everything else. During class, he dances. After class, he dances at home. The only time he rests his arms and legs is when he's asleep. I just can't imagine how terrible it will be if he goes on like this! (249)

    The post-reform generation grew up without the historical points of reference that had characterized earlier generation. Their grandparents had the War of Resistance and the civil war, their parents had the campaigns of the 1950's that culminated in the Great Leap Forward, and their older brothers and sisters had the Cultural Revolution. The youth of the 1980's were a blank slate, but not in the Maoist sense, and rather than being filled with ideology, their heads were filled with dreams of wealth and the newest foreign pop songs. The events of 1989 later provided this drifting generation with a defining moment, but it served only to deepen their existing cynicism and add an edge of bitterness.

    Youth in the 1980's were influenced by the slogans and the excitement of change that surrounded the early years of the reforms. Their generation dropped out of school at record numbers, and their motivations were different than earlier generations that had dropped out to help in farming or to participate in revolutionary activities. Some of the young people, particularly the "hooligans" discussed below, dropped out because of laziness or rebelliousness. Others followed the traditional path of returning to the countryside to assist their families with labor. A rising number, and the largest category among senior high school students, discontinued their studies in order to take or look for a job in the newly expanding market. (250)

    Social attitudes in the youth culture were distinct from the mainstream, especially in ideas about propriety and sexuality. Traditionally, women who felt let alone indulged sexual desire were considered not only "bad" but dangerous as well. Seductive women were also viewed as devious, and in classic literature unrestrained feminine lust often results in the death of her partner. Sexual freedom is traditionally associated with social disorder and as a warning of the impending collapse of a dynasty. (251) Government conservatives and liberal intellectuals have both on occasion made reference to a Chinese "sexual revolution" that occurred in the 1980's, and the conservatives consider it evidence of "spiritual pollution" by Western cultural influences. These evaluations exaggerate the changes in sexual morals, and the traditional prudishness towards sex and disdain for "immoral" women persist even in many members of the younger generations.

    Although the attitude of average young person towards sex remains conservative by Western standards, their level of curiosity, discussion and experimentation is dramatically higher than for the youth of previous generations. Pre-marital sexual activity, or "tasting the forbidden fruit," is on the rise, as shown in a survey of college students conducted in 1989 to 1990. The age of first intercourse for 53.9 percent of men and 49.1 percent of women was nineteen years or younger. Moreover, 87.7 percent of men and 89.1 percent of women had engaged in intercourse by 22 years of age. (252) A majority of students (68.2 percent of women and 62.1 percent of men) moreover responded that they would not mind if their future spouse had previously been sexually involved with someone else. Less than one out of five viewed it as due cause to terminate a relationship. (253) Nevertheless, pre-marital sexual involvement is normally a precursor to marriage, and the majority eventually marry their first partner. Younger people, urban residents and those with a high exposure to Western culture are all slightly less likely than the norm to not marry their first sexual partner. (254) The main distinction of China's so-called sexual revolution is that young people are less likely to wait until marriage to become sexually active.

    A more rebellious branch of the youth subculture emerged in the form of the Liumang, the "hooligans" or alienated youth. The term was applied broadly, and was often used by the government to denounce any group of young people engaging in behavior unapproved of by the central government. Many Liumang live on the fringes of society, living hand-to-mouth and often, but not necessarily, employed in illegal or questionable activities. Others are artists, writers and musicians, often compared to America's beatniks, who establish their own schedule and way of life. Regardless of their origins, definition, and employment, the Liumang represent the rebellious underground of society, and their very existence is viewed as a threat by the party and by the established social order. The Liumang culture is male-dominated and machismo in character. It is based on the ethic of the "knight-errant," which considers loyalty and camaraderie as the foremost values. The street life of bravado and fist fights characterize the Liumang lifestyle, and its driving forces are alcohol, cigarettes, and sex. Most yaogun musicians emerged out of the Liumang scene in Beijing, as did a number of avant-garde writers and painters. (255)

    The artist most responsible for defining the Liumang community for the rest of the world was the writer Wang Shuo. After establishing himself as the quintessential rebel writer in the mid-1980's, Wang ironically went on to work as one of the script writers for the conventional, conservative television drama Kewang. From there, he went on to create a number of other commercially successful television scripts. (256) Prior to his commercial success, Wang Shuo followed the Liumang life. After conflicts with his family, he joined and then dropped out of the military. He then floated from job to job and from mistress to mistress while writing and getting into and out of trouble. In the 1980's he wrote a number of novels and short stories, such as "Air Hostess," and "Hot and Cold, Measure for Measure," which portrayed the Liumang lifestyle while sarcastically mocking society and its values. (257)

    The sharp cynicism bordering on nihilism portrayed in the works of Wang Shuo and others was described by Shanghai literary critic Wang Xiaoming,

Here is the currently trendy Beijing youth culture, and Wang Shuo's works are its artistic expression: to be cool is to mock everything. It results from disillusionment and a sense of powerlessness; it's a logical spasm of a withering Chinese spirit that has been under oppression for half a century. It mocks a dated official ideology which has long lost its grip over the public; more deadly, it dissolves all that might form the foundation of any new spiritual belief, including reason, passion for rebellion, and even certain basic values such as sincerity, steadfastness, respect for others.. In fact, it has already been acquiesced to by the authorities, becoming part of the new ruling ideology. (258)

    Popular culture in and of itself cannot change society, but it can significantly influence society's values and structures. It moreover can function as a conduit of other cultural and indeological influences which may impact the social order. The only definate ramifications of the emergence of popular culture in China are found in the ways in which it has brought enjoyment to everyday life and raised the quality of life somewhat. Theories of "atomisation" notwithstanding, popular culture is basically a neutral form, and the messages conveyed depend on the ideological content of the individual product itself. Liumang culture is not a product of popular culture but of a deeper problem of social and economic marginalization. Popular culture provided the labels that they used to define themselves, but it did not produce their alienation.

    The values conveyed by popular culture are a double-edged sword. The need for mass appeal results in two contradicting but balancing characteristics in popular culture. A degree of shock value is required of the cultural product in order to capture and hold the public's short attention span and to appeal to prurient interests. On the other hand, a cultural product that is deemed "offensive" is relegated to he margins of "avant-garde" art, and thus cannot aspire to being "popular." In order to win public interest and sympathy, popular culture has to appeal to the traditional values and subconscious biases of the society in which it exists.

    Ultimately, popular culture is a creation of the masses and caters to the tastes, interests and prerogatives of the masses. It influences society, but not to the extent that society influences it. Nevertheless, popular culture accurately represents the psyche of a society. Chinese popular culture suggests a society that is clinging confusedly to the old while desperately searching for something new. It hints at a disturbing crisis of identy and moral purpose. Yet it also evidences a resiliant and creative spirit willing and eager to build from the ashes of the past.

Endnotes, Chapter 7 240. Wang, Jing, High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng's China, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press) 1996, p. 263.
241. Chu, Godwin C. and Jun, Yanan, The Great Wall in Ruins: Communication and Cultural Change in China, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press) 1993, p. 196.
242. Ibid., p. 68-70.
243. Ibid., p. 200.
244. Ibid., p. 97.
245. Ibid., p. 211.
246. Ibid., p. 77.
247. Zhang Xinxin, "'How Come You Aren't Divorced Yet?'" in Link, Madsen and Pickowicz (eds.), Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic, (San Francisco: Westview Press) 1989, p.58-59.
248. Riley, Nancy E., "Gender Equality in China: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back," in Joseph, William (ed.), China Briefing: the contradictions of change, (New York: M.E. Sharpe) 1997.p. 89-90.
249. Zheng, Yong, "Break dancing Whirlwind," Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese Youth), v5 (1988) p. 34-36.
250. Rosen, Stanley, "Value Change Among Post-Mao Youth," in Link, Madsen and Pickowicz (eds.), Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic, (San Francisco: Westview Press) 1989, p. 210-211.
251. Barme, Geremie and Jaivin, Linda (eds.), New Ghosts, Old Dreams, (New York: Random House) 1992, p. 293-295.
252. Liu, Ng, Zhou and Haeberle, Sexual Behavior in Modern China, (New York: Continuum) 1997, p. 156-157.
253. Liu, etc. al., p. 189.
254. Liu, etc. al., p. 237-245.
255. Minford, John, "On Liumang," in Barme and Jaivin (eds.), 1992, p. 248-250.
256. Zha, Jianying, 1995, p. 108.
257. Zuo Shula, "A Portrait of the Novelist as a Young Man," in Barme and Jaivin (eds.), p. 217-226
258. Zha, Jianying, China Pop, (New York Press: New York) 1995, p. 110.

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© L Movius, April 1998
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